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COMMENTS
DEDUCTIBILITY OF NONBUSINESS LEGAL EXPENSES
THE LYKES CASE AND BEYOND
Taxpayer owned stock in Lykes Brothers, Inc., a closely held family corpora-
tion. In 1940 he gave part of his stock to his wife and three children, none of
whom were involved in the management of the corporation at the time of the
gift. Taxpayer paid federal gift tax on the stock, stating in his return that the
motive of the gift was his love for the donees. In 1944 the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue revalued the stock and assessed a deficiency of $145,000.
Through his attorney, taxpayer settled the deficiency for $15,600. Taxpayer
paid his attorney $7,000 for legal services in the gift tax controversy, but did not
deduct that expenditure in his 1944 federal income tax return. In 1946 he
claimed a tax refund for the year 1944 on the ground that the attorney's fee
should have been deducted as a nonbusiness expense under section 23 (a) (2) of
the Internal Revenue Code Held by the Supreme Court, refund denied. Lykes
v. United States.2
I
Mr. justice Burton, for the majority, states that "the ordinary and necessary
character of the legal expenses incurred in the instant case is not questioned,"
and their deductibility therefore turns "wholly upon the nature of the activities
to which they relate." 3 In this case the underlying activity was the gift, which
itself was not made for the production or collection of income, or for the manage-
ment, conservation or maintenance of property held for the production of in-
come. Thus, concludes the majority, the related attorney's fee cannot be al-
lowed.4 Taxpayer suggested, apparently as an afterthought, that the gift was
1 26 U.S.C.A. § 23 (1948): "Deductions from gross income. In computing net income there
shall be allowed as deductions: (a) Expenses... (2) Non-trade or non-business expenses. In
the case of an individual, all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year for the production or collection of income, or for the management, conservation,
or maintenance of property held for the production of income." The immediate occasion for
the enactment of section 23(a) (2) was the decision of the Supreme Court in Higgins v. Comm'r,
312 U.S. 212 (1941) (expenses incident to looking after taxpayer's investments in bonds and
stocks held not deductible since not paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business); cf.
United States v. Pyne, 313 U.S. 127 (1941) (attorney fee incurred by nonbusiness executor
in administration of estate disallowed). For historical materials see H.R. Rep. No. 2333 at 46,
74-76, and Sen. Rep. No. 1631 at 87-88, both 77th Cong. 2d Sess. (1942); Diamond, Allow-
ance of Deductions for Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses, 3 N.Y.U. Ann. Inst. on Fed.
Taxation 241-46 (1945).
2 343 U.S. 118 (1952). ' Ibid., at 123.
4 Cf. Nancy Reynolds Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947) (attorney fees incurred in setting up trust
for taxpayer's daughters composed of property contributed by taxpayer by way of gift held
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not really a gift at all, but was part of a general plan to produce income for him-
self and "to fortify the value of his retained stock by giving the younger genera-
tion an interest in the corporation." 5 The Supreme Court dismissed this point
by concluding that "there is no substantial factual basis" for finding that tax-
payer's donation of stock "actually was not the gift he represented it to be."'
Taxpayer's main contention-one which persuaded justices Jackson and
Frankfurter-was that the deficiency assessment could subject taxpayer's in-
come-producing property to liens and possible sale to satisfy an adverse judg-
ment, and that contesting the assessment was therefore an act involving the
management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the production
of income within the meaning of section 23(a)(2). 7 Justice Burton replies:
That argument would carry us too far .... For example, it suggests that the expense of
defending an action based upon personal injuries caused by a taxpayer's negligence
while driving an automobile for pleasure should be deductible. Section 23 (a) (2) never
has been so interpreted by us. It has been applied to expenses on the basis of their
immediate purposes rather than upon the basis of the remote contributions they might
make to the conservation of a taxpayer's income-producing assets by reducing his
general liabilities.8
Justice Jackson joined issue by arguing that "Congress allows a taxpayer to
protect his estate, even against the Treasury," especiallywhere the asserted de-
ficiency is an "unjustified demand" and an "unwarranted exaction." 9 It seems
to him "a tacit slander of the Nation's credit that need for money should drive
us" to disallow taxpayer's expense. However, he suggests no limitation on his
logic that would avoid its extension to Justice Burton's hypothetical negligence
nondeductible). The positigp of Justice Burton is supported by Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-15
(b) (1943), as amended byLT.D. No. 5513, 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 61: "Expenses paid or incurred
by an individual in determining or contesting any liability asserted against him do not become
deductible... by reason of the fact that property held by him for the production of income
may be required to be used or sold for the purpose of satisfying such liability. Thus, expenses
paid or incurred by an individual in the determination of gift tax liability, except to the extent
that such expenses are allocable to interest on a refund of gift taxes, are not deductible, even
though property held by him for the production of income must be sold to satisfy an assess-
ment for such tax liability."
5 United States v. Lykes, 188 F. 2d 964, 966 (C.A. 5th, 1951).
6 343 U.S., at 124, 125.
The same argument was urged unsuccessfully in Frank M. Cobb, 10 T.C. 380 (1948),
aff'd 173 F. 2d 711 (C.A. 6th, 1949) (dissent, 10 T.C. at 386, discusses the legal expense per
se rather than in terms of the underlying transaction to which it is connected, gift of property
to taxpayer's daughters); Thorne Donnelley, 16 T.C. 1196 (1951) (contesting suit to compel
payment of alimony); Joseph Hexter, 3 T.C.M. 1296 (1944) (accountant fees to "dear up"
fraud charge concerning former year's tax return); John W. Willmott, 2 T.C. 321 (1943) (con-
testing income tax deficiency based on transfer of property to wife); Samuel E. Jacobs, 1
T.C.M. 883 (1943) (defending suit for accounting as trustee).
8 343 U.S., at 125.
9 Ibid., at 128, 129.
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case. At bottom, his position would appear to rest on much the same visceral
feeling of inequity as that expressed by the District Court:
To construe the law as giving to the Commissioner the power to assess a taxpayer with
a deficiency tax greatly in excess of what he owes and to hold that such law denies to
the taxpayer the right to contest such assessment, except at his own personal expense,
just isn't justice under the law.10
The Sixth Circuit answers this argument in Cobb v. Comm'r, a case squarely in
point with Lykes:
Ours is not a legislative function.... [T]hough it might seem just to permit a taxpayer
to deduct from his gross income attorneys' fees paid by him in connection with the
settlement of a gift tax liability, we find no warrant in the relevant statute for allowing
the deduction."
II
The taxpayer claiming a nonbusiness deduction has a number of hurdles to
clear. He must show that his expense is "ordinary and necessary" under the
wording of section 23 (a) (2) and that, under the Treasury Regulation interpret-
ing section 23(a) (2), the expense is "reasonable" 2 and bears a "proximate re-
lation" 3 to the production or conservation of income. He may also have to show
that the expense is not "personal" within the meaning of section 24 (a)(1). 14 Of
these requirements, only the proximate relation test has proven effective in
limiting the deductibility of legal expenses.
The requirement that expenses be "ordinary and necessary" has been so re-
fined by judicial interpretation that it is hard to conceive of any situation in
which an attorney's fee would properly be disallowed solely under an "ordinary
and necessary" test. In the leading case of Welch v. Helvering,5 "necessary" be-
comes "appropriate and helpful," and "ordinary," we are told, is "a variable
affected by time and place and circumstance" which need not be habitual or
10 Lykes v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 537, 539 (S.D. Fla., 1949). Significantly enough, no
cases are cited.
11173 F. 2d 711, 715 (C.A. 6th, 1949). Cf. United States v. Lykes, 188 F. 2d 964, 967 (C.A.
5th, 1951): "In view of the great disparity in this deficiency assessment, as indicated by the
comparatively modest sum accepted in settlement, it is not difficult to understand the trial
court's view that to deny this deduction 'just isn't justice under the law.' But the principles of
broad substantial justice and statutory tax law do not always coincide. Nor do exemptions for
income tax purposes turn upon general equitable considerations."
12Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-15 (1943).
"Tbid.
14 Int. Rev. Code § 24(a)(1), 26 U.S.C.A. § 24 (1948): "Items not deductible (a) Generalrule.
In computing net income no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of-(1) Personal,
living, or family expenses...."
15 290 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1933), involving the "ordinary and necessary" phrase of section
23(a)(1)(A). Section 23(a)(2) is "in pari materia" with section 23(a)(1)(A), Trust of Bingham
v. Comm'r, 325 U.S. 365, 374 (1945); therefore business expense cases will occasionally be
cited along with nonbusiness cases to support or illustrate points.
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normal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to make the expense in
question often.
A lawsuit affecting the safety of a business may happen once in a lifetime.... None the
less, the expense is an ordinary one because we know from experience that payments
for such a purpose... are the common and accepted means of defense against at-
tack.16
Definitions of the terms are further expanded in Harry Kanelos.17 Hiring an
attorney is an ordinary act if "consonant with that of a reasonably prudent man
in the same circumstances." "Necessary" need not mean "the shortest route....
The course selected not being frivolous, we are unwilling to substitute our
judgment of its necessity for that of petitioners."
In Comm'r v. Heininger,1 8 taxpayer, a dentist who sold artificial dentures by
mail, incurred legal expenses in a good-faith but unsuccessful resistance to a
fraud order issued by the Postmaster General for alleged fraudulent advertising
by taxpayer. Applying the challenge-response reasoning of the Welch case, the
Supreme Court held that the litigation expenses were an ordinary and necessary
response to the issuance of the fraud order. The Court refused to go behind the
order and consider whether the fraudulent representations were ordinary and
necessary, on the ground that the order was a challenge to taxpayer's business
as a whole, not just to the advertisements: it was a "new business problem."' 9
Once this line of reasoning is adopted, the limiting effect of the "ordinary and
necessary" test with regard to legal expenses evaporates.20 Where the test is in-
voked, it frequently leads to questionable conclusions. In Comrn'r v. Josephs,"'
16 Cf. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488,495-96 (1940). See Louis E. Wakelee, CCH Tax Ct"
Rep. 18,603 (17 T.C. No. 85, 1951) (test is whether deal is a "recognized business transac
tion"; it may qualify even if "somewhat unusual").
17 2 T.C.M. 806 808 (1943) (nonbusiness expense).
18 320 U.S. 467 (1943), aff'ing 133 F. 2d 567 (C.A. 7th, 1943) (business expense).
19 Followed in Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 3 T.C. 310 (1944) (Acq.) (legal expenses
connected with settlement of suit for violation of state antitrust statute held deductible as
business expenses). Cf. Levitt & Sons v. Nunan, 142 F. 2d 795, 798 (C.A. 2d, 1944) (employing
a "reasonable man" test). The Heininger case is discussed in Bruton, The Deductibility of
Legal Expenses in Computing Income Tax, 3 So. Car. L.Q. 107,112 (1950).
20 "Obviously no one is going to employ an attorney unless it is necessary for him to do so-
either for legal advice, guidance or litigation. It would seem that this fact would make a legal
expense always 'ordinary and necessary,' and therefore, always deductible, unless it is (a) per-
sonal, (b) capital, or (c) offends a 'sharply defined public policy.'" Bruton, op. cit. supra
note 19, at 116. But the three qualifications added by Bruton are separate tests. Though the
expense may fall under one of them, and thus fail of deduction, it may still meet the ordinary
and necessary test. Cf. Axe, Deductibility of Non-Business Legal Expenses from Gross Income,
97 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 251, 252 (1948): "Legal expenses are almost always held to be 'ordinary
and necessary,' except where paid for another's benefit, or where paid in connection with
making a gift." But in the Lykes case, the ordinary and necessary character of the legal ex-
penses incurred in making the gift was not questioned.
21 168 F. 2d 233, 236 (C.A. 8th, 1948), rev'ing 8 T.C. 583 (1947), criticized in Tax Deduc-
tion of the Expenses of Mismanagement by Fiduciaries, 58 Yale L.J. 781 (1949); Cf. Comm'r v.
Heide, 165 F. 2d 699 (C.A. 2d, 1948), rev'ing 8 T.C. 314 (1947) (compromise payment itself
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attorney fees incurred by a nonbusiness trustee in settling a charge of misman-
agement were disallowed, the court finding it "impossible to believe" that tax-
payer's expenses "were such as ordinarily and necessarily result from the ac-
tivities of a fiduciary." The Tax Court below had found as a fact that the
trustee expected to be paid for his services and that he would not have accepted
the office if he had not expected to receive compensation. 22 The Tax Court had
allowed the deduction, pointing out that a similar expense for a business trustee
would be deductible 3 and that the policy of section 23 (a) (2) was to correct the
"inequity" of disallowing such expenses for nonbusiness trustees.2 4 Clearly,
under the Heininger doctrine the legal expenses were an ordinary and necessary
response to the challenge of the mismanagement charge."
The decisive question in the Josephs case was whether or not the trustee's
activities which resulted in the charge of mismanagement with its accompany-
ing expenses were proximately related to, or directly connected with, the pro-
duction or collection of income, or the management, conservation or mainte-
nance of property held for the production of income. The Tax Court had no
doubt on the matter:
Certain it is that petitioner entered upon his office as administrator with the expec-
tation of realizing income and that the expense payments in question were a direct
result of his activities as administrator.2
The "reasonable" and "personal" tests have been no more effective than the
"ordinary and necessary" test in limiting deductibility of nonbusiness legal
expenses. In only one reported case has a legal expense been held unreasonable,
disallowed); Estate of Edward W. Clark III, 2 T.C. 676 (1943) (attorney fee in opposing claim
of alleged mismanagement as trustee disallowed partly "for paucity of proof"). The cases are
criticized by Axe, op. cit. supra note 20, at 255 as introducing a "success" criterion for non-
business efforts to collect income which "does not properly reflect the Congressional purpose
in acting section 23(a)(2), because all outlays in connection with production of income are an
expense of whatever income is collected."
228 T.C. at 587. Cf. the Tax Court in Comm'r v. Heide, 8 T.C. 314,319 (1947).
23 E.g., John Abbott, 38 B.T.A. 1290 (1938); see Central Trust Co. v. Burnet, 45 F. 2d 922
(App. D.C., 1930).
14 "Due partly to the inadequacy of the statute and partly to court decisions, nontrade
or nonbusiness expenses are not deductible, although nontrade or nonbusiness income is
fully subject to tax. The bill [for section 23(a)(2)] corrects this inequity." H.R. Rep. No
2333, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. 45 (1942). The policy in general is to tax only net income, no more
and no less. "Taxation on net, not on gross, income has always been the broad basic policy
of our income tax laws." Justice Black, dissenting in McDonald v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 57,
66-67 (1944). See Brodsky and McKibbin, Deduction of Non-Trade or Non-Business Ex-
penses, 2 Tax L. Rev. 39 (1946); Nahstoll, Non-Trade and Non-Business Expense Deduc-
tions, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 1015 (1948). This policy outweighs the consideration that extending
deductibility to legal expense lends a certain encouragement to litigating tax matters with
the Commissioner. See Stoddard v. Comm'r, 141 F. 2d 76, 80 (C.A. 2d, 1944), rev'd, 152
F. 2d 445 (C.A. 2d, 1945).
25 See Bruton, op. cit. supra note 19, at 113-15.
218 T.C. at 589.
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and the facts in that case were somewhat bizarre. 7 Disallowance on the ground
that the expense is personal is usually only the statement of a conclusion based
on a more substantive criterion. To label an expenditure as personal, it must
first be decided that the expenditure is not ordinary or necessary, that it is not
proximately related to the production or collection of income, or that it fails to
satisfy one of the other tests of deductibility. The category of personal expenses
would thus seem to be largely a residual one with little potency in its own right,
at least as far as legal expenses are concerned. 8 For example, legal expenses in
connection with divorce and alimony were considered personal29 until alimony
was made includible in taxable income, after which attorney fees paid in-winning
an award of increased alimony were held deductible. The Tax Court in Elsie B.
Gale"0 stated that the attorney fee was "solely for the purpose of producing or
collecting increased alimony." The Commissioner's argument that the expense
arose from the personal marital relations of the taxpayer was rejected. In
Barbara B. LeMond,8 ' following Gale, the Tax Court allowed the deduction of
that part of taxpayer's legal expenses incurred in securing a financial settlement
incident to divorce which was allocable to the taxable alimony received or re-
ceivable. The Tax Court pointed out that the attorneys who received the fees
"were solely concerned with the financial aspects of the separation rather than
the settlement of the personal or marital difficulties" of taxpayer and her
husband.,- The husband, however, in defending the alimony suit, cannot relate
27Harry Kanelos, 2 T.C.M. 806 (1943). Taxpayers, unable to read or write English, hired
attorney for aid in collecting proceeds of lottery ticket on Irish sweepstakes, agreeing on a fee
of $2,000. After collection, the attorney frightened taxpayers with threats of suit into paying
$18,000. Held, only $2,000 was reasonable. The excess was practically extorted and therefore
"personal in nature." In Annie Laurie Crawford, 5 T.C. 91 (1945) (Acq.), the reasonableness
of a $50,000 legal fee was not questioned although the immediately challenged commission
was only $47,500. See Diamond, Current Decisions on Non-Trade or Non-Business Deduc-
tions, 4 N.Y.U. Ann. Inst. on Fed. Taxation 722, 732 n. 48 (1946). However, the right to
future commissions was also at stake.
28 The usual examples of personal expense-"sport, hobby, or recreation," Treas. Reg. 111,
§ 29.23(a)-15 (1943)-are rarely, if ever, applicable to the costs of litigation. But see Treusch,
"Non-Business Expenses" Relating to the Production or Collection of Income, 2 Am. U. Tax
Inst. 333, 351 (1949).
29 E.g., Frank G. Robins, 8 B.T.A. 523 (1927). In Henry Sanderson, 23 B.T.A. 304 (1931),
aff'd sub nom. Sanderson v. Burnet, 63 F. 2d 268 (App. D.C., 1933), taxpayer's divorced wife
demanded an accounting of the administration of her financial affairs, which had been handled
through an account with a brokerage firm of which taxpayer was for a time a general partner.
Attorney's fees for contesting and finally settling the suit were disallowed as business expenses.
The Board of Tax Appeals reasoned that the expense "was directly related to petitioner's mar-
ital situation and only remotely and incidentally involved his business," 23 B.T.A. at 307; and
the Circuit Court concluded that this was "a personal, rather than a business, controversy."
63 F. 2d at 269.
30 13 T.C. 661 (1949).
"113 T.C. 670 (1949).
32It may be predicted that should a case arise in which the same attorney handles both
the financial and the personal aspects of the divorce, there will be an allocation rather than
complete disallowance.
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his expenses directly to the production or collection of income or the manage-
ment, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of in-
come, except in the indirect sense of preserving his property against liens and
sale to satisfy an adverse judgment. Therefore these expenses have been dis-
allowed. 3
III
Although the Lykes case is based squarely on a proximate relation rationale,"4
it attempts little analysis of the proximate relation concept beyond substituting
33Lindsay C. Howard, 16 T.C. 157 (1951); Thorne Donnelley, 16 T.C. 1196 (1951).
Contra: Arthur B. Baer, 5 CCH 1952 Fed. Tax Rep. 9310 (C.A. 8th), rev'ing 16 T.C. 1418
(1951), discussed in note 42 infra. In Howard, taxpayer, a U.S. Army captain, was allowed to
deduct legal expenses incurred in defending court martial proceedings for Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and a Gentleman in failing to pay alimony where conviction would have resulted
in loss of his job as an officer. The result may be justified on the ground that the court martial
was a direct attack on Howard's occupation, whereas the unsuccessful defense of the alimony
suit had no immediate effect on his Army position. Cf. Waldo Salt, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. 18,943
(18 T.C. No. 24, 1952): taxpayer, a movie script writer summoned to testify before a Con-
gressional committee investigating Communist infiltration in the movie industry, hired counsel
to advise him concerning his rights and duties as a witness and to help prevent a threatened
blacklisting by the movie industry. The attorney fee was held deductible under section
23(a) (1) (A) as directly connected with taxpayer's business.
"4 There are, of course, other effective limitations on deductibility under section 23(a) (2)
besides the proximate relation test. (1) The legal expenses must be related to taxable income,
i.e., income which, if and when realized, will be required to be included in income for Federal
income tax purposes. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-15 (1943). (2) The income involved must be
that of the taxpayer's. Borderline situations may arise. In William J. Laidlaw, 3 T.C.M. 865
(1944), expenses of marketing $200,000 of a corporation's certificates, where necessary to give
market value to $50,000 of the certificates retained by taxpayer, were held fully deductible
since the expense was primarily for taxpayer's benefit and any benefit to the corporation was
merely incidental. Query, whether an allocation might not have been more appropriate. Cf.
Davis B. Thornton, 4 T.C.M. 29 (1945): A and B each owned one-half of the stock of a cor-
poration. A brought a derivative stockholder's suit against B charging waste and ultra
vires acts and praying for accounting, damages and injunction. The corporation was named as
nominal defendant. B defended the suit in his own name and the corporation paid his attorney
fee. The corporation was allowed to deduct part of this expense under section 23(a) (1) (A) on
the theory that it derived some benefit from B's successful defense. Section 2 3 (a)(2) applies to
individuals, and corporations or partnerships may not claim under it. Robert S. Seese, 7 T.C.
925 (1946). (3) The legal expense must avoid the category of "capital expenditures." Treas.
Reg. 111, § 2 9.2 3(a)-15 (1943). See Bruton, op. cit. supra note 19, at 121-27; Axe, op. cit.
supra note 20, at 258-61; Plumb, "Non-Business" Expenses Relating to Property, 2 Am. U.
Tax Inst. 357 (1949). (4) Where the expense is for the management of property, the property
must be income-producing. See B. M. Spears, 6 T.C.M. 303 (1947) (property involved, a series
of notes bearing no interest until maturity, held not income-producing; expense disallowed).
Contrast Stella Elkins Tyler, 6 T.C. 135 (1946) (Acq.). (5) The expense must not "frustrate
sharply defined" public policy. Comm'r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943). See Charles
Goodman, 9 T.C.M. 789 (1950) (fact that legal fees incurred in connection with civil fraud
charge held no bar to deductibility); M. J. Donnelly, 7 T.C.M. 839 (1948) (attorney fee in
income tax indictment where taxpayer found guilty held not deductible); Treusch, op. cit.
supra note 28, at 350; Krassner, Can a Deduction for Legal Fees Be against Public Policy?,
26 Taxes 447 (1948) (urging view that public policy favors full benefit of counsel and therefore
wider deductibility of the legal fees of wrongdoers); Deduction of Business Expenses: Illegality
and Public Policy, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 852, 856 (1941), arguing that while disallowing a statutory
fine may be justifiable in making taxpayer "actually bear the burden of the fine," refusal to
19531 COMMENTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
synonyms: the expense must have a "direct" or "immediate" connection with
23(a)(2)-type activities, as opposed to an "indirect" or "remote" connection."
The test is not whether the expense succeeds in producing or conserving in-
come." Nor does it seem necessary for the expense to be so rigorously connected
with the attempt to produce or conserve income that the attempt would be
bound to fail absent the expense.37 The requirement is rather that the activity
from which the expense flows must be embarked on with the direct expectation
of producing or conserving income. In the Lykes case, the activity which resulted
in the legal expense was the gift of stock. On the facts, the only motive for the
gift was love; there was no expectation of producing or conserving income.
Therefore the deduction was properly disallowed.
Family transfers are rarely made with the expectation of producing or con-
serving income for the transferor, and deductions for expenditures arising from
such transfers are consequently seldom allowed as management expenses. 8
However, in Nancy Reynolds Bagley,39 taxpayer paid attorney fees for advice
concerning plans to establish an inter vivos trust with income reserved to tax-
payer for life, and to set up certain testamentary trusts. The fee was held de-
ductible on the theory that the purpose of the estate planning was to increase
allow legal expenses invokes "an additional penalty for wrongdoing completely unrelated in
dollar amount to the statutory exaction." The propriety of any judge-made notions of public
policy in a field so thoroughly statutory as tax law may be questioned. Cf. Arent, Deductibility
of Penalties and Related Expenses, 2 Am. U. Tax Inst. 373 (1949). In Lilly v. Comm'r, 343
U.S. 90 (1952), taxpayer in optical business paid one-third of the retail price of eyeglasses
sold by him to the doctors who had prescribed the glasses. These kickbacks were held de-
ductible as business expenses, the Supreme Court finding no declared public policies proscrib-
ing the payments.
35 343 U.S. at 125; 188 F. 2d at 967.
Compare James A. Connelly, 6 T.C. 744 (1946), with Howard E. Cammack, 5 T.C. 467
(1945). See Treusch, op. cit. supra note 28, at 48. But cf. Marion A. Burt Beck, 15 T.C. 642
(1950), aff'd, 5 CCH 1952 Fed. Tax Rep. 9219 (C.A. 2d), and C. C. McClees, 4 T.C.M. 39
(1945), with Stella Elkins Tyler, 6 T.C. 135 (1946) (Acq.). The income to which the expense is
related is not limited to income of the taxable year but also includes income which the tax-
payer has realized in a prior taxable year or may realize in subsequent taxable years. Treas.
Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-15 (1943). The legal expenses incurred in protecting the right to income
after its receipt are deductible. See, e.g., Harold K. Hochschild, 7 T.C. 81, 88 (1946), rev'd on
another issue, 161 F. 2d 817 (C.A. 2d, 1947); William A. Falls, 7 T.C. 66 (1946) (Acq.); Estate
of Frederick Cecil Bartholomew, 4 T.C. 349, 359 (1944); Kornhauser v. United States, 276
U.S. 145 (1928) (business expense). Income is not confined to recurring income but applies as
well to gains from the disposition of property. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23 (a)-15 (1943). See, e.g.,
Margery K. Megargel, 3 T.C. 238 (1944) (Acq.); Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371 (1943), aff'd 147
F. 2d 376 (C.A. 9th, 1945).
37 But cf. Comm'r v. Heide, 165 F. 2d 699, 701 (1947); Hyman Y. Josephs, 8 T.C. 583,
591-93 (dissent). See Tax Deduction of the Expenses of Mismanagement by Fiduciaries, 58
Yale L.J. 781 (1949).
31 See Plumb, op. cit. supra note 34, at 361; Brodsky and McKibbin, op. cit. supra note 24,
at 64.
3" 8 T.C. 130 (1947).
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the yield and reduce taxes, 40 although it is probable that much of the planning
was directed to the transfer of taxpayer's property rather than to improving
her income position.0 Had Lykes made a more convincing argument that the
transfer of stock actually was partly for the management of the retained stock,
either by enhancing its value through inducing "the younger generation" to
take an active part in the direction of the company, or by insuring continuity of
family ownership and control of the company, the resulting problem would be
somewhat analogous to that of the .Bagley case.4 The courts in this event could
select one of two types of analysis: the "all-or-none" analysis which turns on
the distinction between capital expenditures and ordinary expense; and the allo-
cation analysis in which an attempt is made to value the various elements
involved.
In the capital expenditure cases, the analysis is often in terms of whether or
not the litigation out of which the legal expenses arose involved questions of
right or title to property. Where the litigation involves defending or perfecting
taxpayer's right or title to property, the whole expense is usually disallowed,43
40 Reduction of taxes is a proper management function. See Andrew Jergens, 2 T.C.M.
385, 388 (1943) (merger of two companies to minimize taxpayer's tax liabilities); Comm'r v.
Newman, 159 F. 2d 848, 851-52 (C.A. 2d, 1947) (L. Hand, J., dissenting). But cf. John W.
WiUmott, 2 T.C. 321 (1943).
"See Axe, op. cit. supra note 20, at 258.
4This line of argument must be sharply distinguished from the analysis in Arthur B.
Baer, 5 CCH Fed. Tax Rep. 9310 (C.A. 8th), rev'ing 16 T.C. 1418 (1951), cert. not author-
ized, 5 CCH 1952 Fed. Tax Rep. 48,004. In the Baer case taxpayer's wife demanded a large
lump sum payment of alimony. Taxpayer's assets were largely represented by a controlling block
of stock in a corporation. Taxpayer hired attorneys who succeeded in arranging an alimony
settlement that enabled taxpayer to retain his controlling stock interest. Taxpayer's legal
fees were held deductible. The court stated: "The controversy did not go to the question of
liability but to the manner in which it might be met by the petitioner without greatly dis-
turbing his financial structure." The fees "were not to prevent the payment of the liability due
Mrs. Baer but to so adjust the method of satisfying that liability as not unnecessarily to
reduce petitioner's income from the property which confessedly he owned." On this rationale
the majority of the court concluded that the fees were incurred in conserving and maintaining
property for the production of income within the meaning of section 23(a)(2). A dissent
argued that the basic transaction to which the fees were related-the alimony controversy-
was a personal matter; i.e., not embarked on with the expectation of producing or conserving
income. The dissent appears to have the better of the argument. The thrust of the hypothetical
extension of the Lykes case suggested in the text is the voluntariness of the gift. Lykes could
argue that he chose to enter into the gift transaction to conserve his income-producing property.
This voluntary aspect is absent in Baer. The majority itself admits that there is no question of
taxpayer's liability. Thus the only sense property is being conserved is in the sense of protec-
tion against possible sale to satisfy an adverse judgment. This argument will not suffice to
bring the expense within section 23(a) (2). See text and note at note 7 supra. It may be predicted
that the Supreme Court will overrule the Baer case as contrary to Lykes if and when it con-
siders an analogous question.
3 E.g., Garrett v. Crenshaw, 5 CCH 1952 Fed. Tax Rep. 9251 (E.D. Va.) (action by
taxpayer against estate of his dead son to show that son held certain property in trust for tax-
payer and on his behalf); Addison v. Comm'r, 177 F. 2d 521 (C.A. 8th, 1949) (defense of suit
brought by decedent's daughter to set aside transfers of property by decedent to taxpayer on
grounds of fraud); James C. Couglin, 3 T.C. 420 (1944) (defense of petition for perpetuation of
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with the exception of that part allocable to the ownership of any taxable in-
come.44 Where the litigation is incident to the management of property and no
questions of title are involved, the whole expense is deductible.45 In borderline
cases, the courts may say that the questions of right and title are not "primary"
testimony by taxpayer's brother on charge that taxpayer's deceased mother had some interest
in taxpayer's business, demanding accounting, impression of trust, appointment of receiver);
Bowers v. Lumpkin, 140 F. 2d 927 (C.A. 4th, 1944) (defense of suit by state attorney general to
invalidate sale of stock to taxpayer and to make taxpayer account for the
profits); Cynthia K. Herbst, 2 T.C.M. 361 (1943). Legal expenses may also be
disallowed on analogy with selling commissions, Don A. Davis, 4 T.C. 329 (1944). See H. C.
Naylor, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. 18,656 (17 T.C. No. 113, 1951). Agnes Pyne Coke, CCH Tax
Ct. Rep. 18,532 (17 T.C. No. 45, 1951), seems to run against the trend of the cases. Taxpayer
brought action against her former husband to recover her share of community porperty. The
action was settled out of court by a sale involving a capital gain, a portion of the proceeds
going to taxpayer. The legal expense was allocated between capital gain and the valuation basis
of the property, and deduction of the amount allocable to the gain was permitted despite the
fact that the entire expense was incurred in an action to recover property.
4 Ralph E. Hedges, CCH Fed. Tax Rep. 19,078, 18 T.C. No. 81 (1952) (expenses in
action for recovery of stock and dividends allocated between value of stock recovered and cash
amount of dividends, and allowed only for the latter); Kimbrell v. Dallman, 80 F. Supp. 695
(S.D. Ill., 1948) (expenses in action to set aside deed of oil lands for fraud and to account for in-
come allocated between fair market value of capital assets recovered and income and allowed
only for the latter); Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 886 (D. Conn.,
1948); William A. Falls, 7 T.C. 66 (1946) (Acq.) (expenses for defense of suit to compel trans-
fer of patents and accounting of royalties were allocated between transfer and accounting
and allowed only for the latter); cf. Helvering v. Stormfeltz, 142 F. 2d 982 (C.A. 8th, 1944)
(litigation expenses in connection with the collection of unliquidated claims against a former
guardian were allowed only to the extent allocable to the recovery of taxable interest). The
difficult problem of valuing the capital interest in order to achieve the correct allocation has
received little attention in the cases. See Plumb, op. cit. supra note 34, at 367.
45 Thus the legal expenses of setting up a trust, where the trust device is not incident to a
gift but is an instrumentality for managing property held for the production of income, is de-
ductible. Nancy Reynolds Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947); N.Y. Title & Mort. Co. Certificate
Trustees, 2 T.C. 990 (1943). In Stella Elkins Tyler, 6 T.C. 135 (1946) (Acq.), attorney fees
paid in a wills contest in which taxpayer, income beneficiary of a testamentary trust, increased
her share of the annual trust income from one-eighth to one-sixth were held deductible. While
section 23(a) (2) preserves the capital expenditures test of section 23(a) (1) (A), it allows ordi-
nary legal expenses pertaining to capital gains income as well as regular income to be de-
ducted. In Carl W. Braznell, 16 T.C. 503 (1951) (Acq.), damages paid by taxpayer for breach
of contract to pay brokerage commissions for negotiation of sale of taxpayer's property held
deductible where taxpayer retained property for a while for the production of income and then
sold it through another broker, realizing capital gain. In Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371 (1943),
aff 'd, 147 F. 2d 376 (C.A. 9th, 1945), attorney fees paid in a proceeding to require a merging
corporation to pay off in cash dissenting stockholders, including taxpayer, were deductible.
The Tax Court said: "It is obvious.., that Congress intended that some expenditures per-
taining to assets of a purely capital nature were to be allowed as deductions." In Margery K.
Megargel, 3 T.C. 238 (1944) (Acq.), while a question of ownership was involved, legal ex-
penses in suit by taxpayer (settled for cash) to annul transfer of stock for fraud and to recover
stock were held deductible. Cf. Truman H. Newberry, 4 T.C.M. 576 (1945), in which tax-
payer sought an injunction declaring certain county drain bonds owned by him to be valid.
Taxpayer was unsuccessful, and his bonds were rendered worthless. Legal expenses incident
to the suit for injunction were held deductible as paid for the conservation of property held
for the production of income.
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and allow deduction of the whole expense. 46 The notion seems to be that a par-
ticular disbursement is either all in or all out of the capital expenditure cate-
gory.47 The courts might deal with the "gift" category in a similar fashion.
The allocation cases try to apportion a given expense by relating it to the
various aspects of the transaction from which it arose. Where the legal fee is
paid for recovery of a money judgment part of which represents taxable income
and part of which does not, allocation is achieved by a'simple mathematical ap-
plication of the ratio between the two parts of the judgment to the fee. 48 Where
a single legal fee covers a series of transactions, expenses in relation to some
of which are deductible and others not,4 9 or where a single fee covers a transac-
tion with a double aspect, 0 the courts allocate as best they can unless no basis
45 E.g., in Selig v. Allen, 5 CCH 1952 Fed. Tax Rep. 9279 (M.D. Ga.), taxpayer incurred
legal fees in action to establish her one-half interest in property her deceased husband had
purchased in his name on the understanding that taxpayer was to have such an interest. The
purpose of the suit was to avoid inclusion of the property in husband's estate, thereby avoiding
heavy estate taxes. There was also a possibility that executors would sell the property. Held,
question of title was "incidental" since taxpayer as residuary legatee would ultimately acquire
title by inheritance in any event. The legal fees were allowed. In Rassenfoss v. Comm'r, 158
F. 2d 764 (C.A. 7th, 1946), legal expenses incurred in defending suit by partner for dissolution
of partnership, appointment of receiver and accounting held deductible, relying heavily on
Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928). Cf. Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. United
States, 79 F. Supp. 886 (D. Conn., 1948) (in action to rescind sale of stock for fraud, title
question held incidental to charge of breach of duty); Estate of Frederick Cecil Bartholomew,
4 T.C. 349, 359 (1944); Pierce Estates, Inc., 3 T.C. 875 (1944) (Non-acq.) (taxpayers brought
action of trespass to try title only to place lis pendens on record so that leases the royalty
payments for which were in dispute could not be transferred); Levitt & Sons v. Nunan, 142 F.
2d 795 (C.A. 2d, 1944) (business expense); Samuel D. Leidesdorf, 26 B.T.A. 881 (1932) (same).
47In Harold K. Hochschild, 7 T.C. 81 (1946), rev'd, 161 F. 2d 817 (C.A. 2d, 1947), legal
expenses were incurred in the successful defense of suit to impress a trust on stock held by
taxpayer, director of corporation, charging breach of fiduciary duty. The Tax Court disallowed
the expense as one incurred in defense of title. The Circuit Court reversed, arguing that the
main issue was breach of fiduciary duty and the title question was only incidental. A dissent
unsuccessfully suggested that the expense be allocated somehow or other between the two
issues. 161 F. 2d at 820.
48 E.g., Barbara B. LeMond, 13 T.C. 670 (1949); Cynthia K. Herbst, 2 T.C.M. 361 (1943);
William J. Garland, 2 T.C.M. 419 (1943); Percival E. Foerderer, 1 T.C.M. 677 (1943), aff'd,
141 F. 2d 53 (C.A. 3d, 1944) (achieving the specious exactitude of 34.17% to 65.83%); Edward
Mallinckrodt, Jr., 2 T.C. 1128 (1943), aff'd on another issue, 146 F. 2d 1 (C.A. 8th, 1945).
Where taxpayer successfully defends a suit, the same method may be employed. See Harold K.
Hochschild, 7 T.C. 81 (1946) (fee allocated between amount of dividend income and fair
market value of stock where suit sought accounting for dividends and to impress a trust on
stock). Where taxpayer sues for a money judgment and loses, the allocation could be per-
formed as if he had won. See Axe, op. cit. supra note 20, at 261-62 (semble). For a recent case
where the allocation formula is agreed on by both sides, see Glenshaw Glass Co., CCH Tax Ct.
Rep. 19,146 (18 T.C. No. 108, 1952).
49 E.g., Merton E. Farr, 11 T.C. 552 (1948); Nancy Reynolds Bagley, 8 T.C. 130, 134
(1947); Perry A. Yeast, 6 T.C.M. 1215 (1947); Donald V. Smith, 6 T.C.M. 548 (1947).
50 E.g., Norman M. Hussey, CCH 1952 Tax Ct. Memo. Dec. 141 (joining a club). "Abso-
lute certainty in such matters isusually impossible and is not necessary; the Board should
make as close an approximaton as it can, bearing heavily if it chooses upon the taxpayer
whose inexactitude is of his own making." L. Hand, J., in Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F. 2d 540,
543-44 (C.A. 2d, 1930) (entertainment expenses). Cohan kept no account and the Conmmis-
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for allocation is present whatsoever, in which event the entire expense will be
disallowed."
The Lykes transfer made both for love and for management would be closely
analogous to transactions with a double aspect, such as joining a social club both
to have fun and to make business contacts. 2 It would seem proper in such a
case to allocate rather than to employ an all-or-none principle.3 In any event,
attorneys can increase the value of their services by the manner in which they
bill their clients for various services rendered, where the manner of billing is apt
to be significant tax-wise. 4
IV
The Lykes case, in its handling of Trust of Bingham v. Comm'r,"1 may result
in a re-application of the proximate relation test to legal expenses incurred in
federal income tax litigation. Prior to the Bingham case, the courts required a
showing that the transaction out of which the income tax dispute arose was
proximately related to the production or collection of income or the manage-
ment, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of in-
come. " Only where such a showing was made was the expense deductible.5 7 The
sioner had refused to allow any deduction "on the ground that it was impossible to tell how
much he had in fact spent, in the absence of any items or details." Ibid., at 543. See Gluck,
How Cohan Works: Allowance of Business Expense Reductions When No Exact Records
are Kept, 6 Rutgers L. Rev. 375 (1952).
51 In Donald V. Smith, 6 T.C.M. 548, 555 (1947); Don A. Davis, 4 T.C. 329, 335 (1944);
and Cynthia K. Herbst, 2 T.C.M. 361, 364 (1943), no clear showing is made that any item is
deductible. However, Joseph Hexter, 3 T.C.M. 1296 (1944), and John W. Willmott, 2 T.C.
321, 328 (1943), assume that part of the fee is deductible and still disallow the entire amount.
These cases seem to violate the Cohan rule. Where the nondeductible items are very small, the
court may ignore them. See, e.g., Albert W. Russel, 3 T.C.M. 817, 822 (1944) (secretary's
entire salary held deductible though she occasionally wrote "incidental" letters of a purely
personal nature and no allocation was shown).
62 E.g., Norman M. Hussey, CCH 1952 Tax Ct. Memo. Dec. 141. See Gluck, op. cit. supra
note 50, at 395-97.
5sThe administrative problem would be simplified by the fact that the Tax Court alloca-
tion would be a finding of fact that higher courts would give only limited review. See Dobsonv.
Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943). The burden is on the taxpayer and a "presumption of
correctness" attaches even to the Commissioner's allocation. Merton E. Farr, 11 T.C. 552
(1948).
54See Lynch, Legal Expenses as Deductions from Income, 12 Fordharn L. Rev. 8 (1943).
The prevailing practice, of course, is not to itemize. See Axe, op. cit. supra note 20, at 261-62;
Gluck, op. cit. supra note 50. Cf. Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.54-1 (1943), requiring taxpayers to keep
"such permanent books of account or records ... as are sufficient to establish the amount of
.. the deductions."
5f 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
56In John W. Willmott, 2 T.C. 321 (1943) taxpayer incurred legal expenses for (1) suc-
cessfully contesting income tax deficiency based on charge that transfer of one-half of tax-
payer's property to his wife to cut taxpayer's income tax was ineffective, and (2) successfully
contesting charge that sale of securities to son to establish deductible capital losses was not
bona fide. Held, giving away property is not management; thus (1) not deductible, and even
though (2) may be, taxpayer claimed deductions for (1) and (2) as a whole and made no show-
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Bingham case followed the same rule. Legal fees were incurred in contesting un-
successfully an income tax deficiency assessed on a capital gain realized by the
distribution to a beneficiary of trust property which had appreciated in value.
The most debatable question was whether distribution was an act of manage-
ment of property held for the production of income. The Tax Court held that it
was, since it was "one, if not the most, vital duty imposed upon those trus-
tees."58
ing that could serve as basis for allocation. Hence both expenses disallowed. In Aldus C.
Higgins, 2 T.C. 948 (1943), aff'd, 143 F. 2d 654 (C.A. 1st, 1944), attorney's fee for advice on
income tax matters was held nondeductible. Taxpayer's counsel stated he was "not concerned
with refinements as to the nature of the tax services rendered," but "intended to present only
the broad question whether a fee paid by an individual to a law firm for tax advice and for
services in preparing income tax returns is deductible under section 23 (a)(2)." Said the
Tax Court: "Petitioner would have us lay down the general rule that the cost of tax advice
and of the preparation of tax returns is necessarily, and in all cases, incurred either in pro-
ducing or collecting income or in managing, conserving, or maintaining property held for such
purpose. We are not prepared to lay down such a broad rule nor do we think it would be
warranted by the statute." In Cynthia K. Herbst, 2 T.C.M. 361 (1943), (1) attorney fee in
securing refund of income taxes and interest on the ground that stock and loans held by tax-
payer had become worthless held nondeductible except for portion allocable to recovery of
taxable interest. In reply to taxpayer's claim that the expense was incurred for management
of property held for the production of income, the Tax Court said: "No evidence was offered
to show that the stock or the evidence of the loans were held for the production of income. We
may not assume that they were so held." (2) Evidence held insufficient to allow deduction of
attorney fee incurred in reducing the amount of proposed income tax deficiency. In Hord v.
Comm'r, 143 F. 2d 73 (C.A. 6th, 1944), proof held too "meagre" to support taxpayer's burden
of showing that legal expense incurred in contesting tax assessments and accountant fees for
preparation of income tax returns fell within deductions allowed by statute. Said the court:
"Cases may arise wherein the deduction of attorneys' fees expended in income tax litigation
would be legitimate; but in our judgment the instant situation presents no such case." See
James S. Floyd, 2 T.C.M. 776 (1943); Don A. Davis, 4 T.C. 329 (1944), aff'd, 151 F. 2d 441
(C.A. 8th, 1943); Ralph J. Green, 3 T.C. 74 (1944).
5 In R. C. Coffey, 1 T.C. 579 (1943), attorney fee in obtaining reduction of local tax assess-
ments on taxpayer's business property held deductible under section 23(a) (2); accountant fee
for adjustment of local taxes on income-producing securities held deductible as management
of property held for the production of income; accountant fee for "accounting and income
tax matters" without further showing held nondeductible. In Charles N. Manning, 3 T.C.
853 (1944), aff'd, 148 F. 2d 821 (C.A. 6th, 1945), litigation expenses of a stockholder in a suc-
cessful suit to resist transferee liability for taxes on profits from disposing of assets of corpora-
tion held deductible. Since the original transaction (sale of stock for profit) bore a proximate
relation to the collection of income, any litigation arising out of that transaction was also so
related. See Ezra Winter, 1 T.C.M. 274 (1942) (one-half of accountant fee in preparing tax-
payer's income tax return held deductible).
5S Mary Lily Bingham Trust, 2 T.C. 853, 859 (1943). The Supreme Court agreed, stating
that the duty of distribution "is an integral part of carrying out the trust enterprise." 325
U.S. at 375. Cf. Cynthia K. Herbst, 2 T.C.M. 361 (1943) (legal fee in connection with termina-
tion of trust held paid for production of income and thus deductible under section 23(a)(2) ).
Accord: Spear v. Gagne, 49 F. Supp. 263 (D.N.H., 1943). The Circuit Court in the Bingham
case, sub nom. Comm'r v. Kenan, 145 F. 2d 568, 570 (C.A. 2d, 1944), had reversed the Tax
Court, A. Hand, J., contending that property held for distribution is not property held for
income and that it takes "an extremely liberal interpretation" in a case where strictness is
more appropriate to be able to equate the two concepts. The meaning of "management" raises
troublesome problems. The existence or nonexistence of a duty may be relevant where the
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Judge Tyson, for the Tax Court majority, then proceeded to argue that the
action of the trustees in defending the trust property against a possible tax lien
was "obviously a factor in the conservation, management, and maintenance of
the property." Disney, dissenting, properly pointed out that Tyson's logic
would permit deducting the expenses of contesting any threatened tax lien.
Kern, concurring, put the case on a solid foundation by reasoning that the ex-
penses arose out of the distribution-a proper management function-and were
therefore deductible as proximately related to management. The Supreme
Court rested its opinion on Kern's rationale:
The Tax Court could find as a matter of fact, as it did, that the expenses of contest-
ing the income taxes were a proximate result of the holding of the property for income.
And we cannot say, as a matter of law, that such expenses are any less deductible than
expenses of suits to recover income.59
Despite the explicit use of the proximate relation test in the Bingham case,
the interpretation given the case by the lower courts has had the effect of allow-
ing the deduction of expenses paid or incurred by the taxpayer in determining
his income tax liability without requiring him to make a showing of proximate
relation to the production or conservation of income.60 Commentators have
claimed act of management is a transfer. See John W. Willmott, 2 T.C. 321 (1943) and Frank
M. Cobb, 10 T.C. 380 (1948), aff'd, 173 F. 2d 711 (C.A. 6th, 1949), in which the transfers
were held voluntary gifts. Cf. Nancy Reynolds Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947) (attorney fee in-
curred in release of power of appointment over trust property of which taxpayer was income
beneficiary, where release had no effect on taxpayer's income during her life but was for the
purpose of preventing the property from falling into her gross estate on her death, held non-
deductible, for no proximate relation to management or conservation of property held for
production of income). Legal expenses incurred in defending suit for breach of contract in the
sale of stock held for the production of income were held deductible under section 23(a)(2) in
William P. Toms, 5 T.C.M. 183 (1946), on the rationale that the negotiations resulting in the
sale constituted management of property held for the production of income and that the liti-
gation expenses arising from these negotiations were proximately related to the act of manage-
ment. Cf. Carl W. Braznell, 16 T.C. 503 (1951) (Acq.) (damages for breach of contract to pay
brokerage commission for sale of real property held deductible where taxpayer retained real
property for production of income and later sold through another broker). Whether or not the
act is one of management may turn on whether the property acted upon is held for the pro-
duction of income. See Howard E. Cammack, 5 T.C. 467 (1945) (attempted deduction of cost
of worthless stock originally purchased for production of income is act of management). But
cf. Cynthia K. Herbst, 2 T.C.M. 361, 366 (1943); Helvering v. Stormfeltz, 142 F. 2d 982
(C.A. 8th, 1944); Edmunds v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Mo., 1947). In Kohns-
tamm v. Pedrick, 66 F. Supp. 410 (S.D. N.Y., 1946), legal expenses of court proceedings
instituted by incompetent's committee for instruction whether right of election to take as
in intestacy should be exercised on incompetent's behalf were held deductible under section23(a)(2) as ordinary and necessary management expenses. But expenditures incurred in as-
serting or protecting one's right to property of a decedent as heir or legatee are not de-
ductible. Marion A. Burt Beck, 15 T.C. 642 (1950), aff'd, 5 CCH 1952 Fed. Tax Rep. 9219
(C.A. 2d); C. C. McClees, 4 T.C.M. 39 (1945).
59 325 U.S. at 376.
11 In Howard E. Cammack, 5 T.C. 467 (1945), proximate relation was found. In Horace
Mill, 5 T.C. 691 (1945), the legal expense was held not deductible in the absence of evidence
concerning the nature of the attorney's services. In Herbert Marshall, 5 T.C. 1032 (1925)
(Acq.), taxpayer and his wife filed separate returns under the California community property
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suggested that the new rule,"' which clearly goes beyond the statute, 2 might be
justified by administrative expediency, since a proximate relation usually exists
in income tax cases.3 But proximate relation may not always exist. The con-
troversy resulting in the legal expense may involve the question of whether the
expenses of a tort suit are deductible, or whether a certain person can be
claimed as a dependent.8 4 Problems of weighing evidence, allocation and the
like are no more formidable than elsewhere and are hardly an excuse for exceed-
ing statutory limitations. In distinguishing the Bingkam case, the Lykes case
emphasizes that the Binghar expenses "were integral parts of the management
or conservation of the trust property for the production of income." Perhaps it
was intended that the lower courts should take the hint and require a showing
that income tax litigation expenses are directly connected to section 23(a)(2)-
type activities.
The Lykes case may also help to lay to rest the doctrine that deductions de-
pend on legislative grace and should therefore be construed strictly. 5 Justice
Burton states: "Such an interpretation is not necessary here and is not relied
upon in this case."66 Burton's rule is that the extent of the deductions allowed
laws. The Commissioner asserted a deficiency on the theory that taxpayer was not entitled
to take advantage of the law. Litigation expenses connected with the deficiency were held
deductible on the authority of Bingham and Cammack. While apparently no showing of
proximate relation was required by the Tax Court, it is arguable that taxpayer's attempted
separate returns were an effort to minimize taxes on property held for the production of in-
come and were thereby acts of management with which the litigation expenses were directly
connected. There was no showing one way or the other in Stoddard v. Comm'r, 152 F. 2d
445 (C.A. 2d, 1945), rev'ing 141 F. 2d 76 (C.A. 2d, 1944); Williams v. McGowan, 152 F. 2d
570 (C.A. 2d, 1945); William Heyman, 6 T.C. 799 (1946) (Acq.) (Disney dissenting); and
M. J. Donnelly, 7 T.C.M. 839 (1948). Proximate relation was shown in Philip D. Armour,
6 T.C. 359 (1946) (Acq.) (legal fees for contesting transferee liability for personal holding
company tax deficiency held deductible); James A. Connelly, 6 T.C. 744 (1946) (same as
Cammack); and Norbert H. Wiesler, 6 T.C. 1148 (1946) (Acq.) (legal fees for services in con-
testing income tax deficiencies involving taxpayer's stock trading activities held deductible).
Proximate relation of accounting fees to management of property (income-producing stocks
and securities) was found in David L. Loew, 7 T.C. 363, 371 (1946) (Acq.).
61 See Bruton, op. cit. supra note 19, at 115; Weseman, Income Tax: Deductibility of Non-
business and Nontrade Expenses, 34 Calif. L. Rev. 212, 219 (1946).
62See Treusch, op. cit. supra note 28, at 345; Brodsky and McKibbin, op. cit. supra note
24, at 64.
61 See Brodsky and McKibbin, op. cit. supra note 24, at 64; Axe, op. cit. supra note 20, at
257.
"4 See Disney, J. dissenting in William Heyman, 6 T.C. 799 (1946) (Acq.). Cf. Diamond,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 258, commenting on Aldus C. Higgins, 2 T.C. 948 (1943), aff'd, 143 F.
2d 654 (C.A. 1st, 1944) (discussed note 55 supra): "With that rule there should be little basis
for any serious difference of opinion; there is nothing inherently so peculiar in the cost of tax
advice or of securing tax refunds which justifies any fixed rule not applicable to other costs."
61 See, e.g., McDonald v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 57, 60 (1944); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488,
493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
"343 U.S. at 120 n. 4, citing Griswold, An Argument against the Doctrine that Deductions
Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1142 (1943).
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by section 23 "depends upon the legislative policy expressed in the fair and
natural meaning of that section."6 The fairness rule would seem to accord more
nearly than the doctrine of legislative grace with the intent of Congress to tax
only net income. 8
There is evidence to indicate that the tax bar is not satisfied with the Lykes
case, and that an effort may be made to change the result of the case by legisla-
tion. 9 However, in clarifying the reason for the rule denying deductibility to
legal expenses incurred in gift tax litigation, the Lykes case may help to stem
somewhat the flood of litigation under section 23(a)(2).
EXTINGUISHMENT OF EASEMENTS AND OTHER INTERESTS
BY TAX SALE OF DELINQUENT PROPERTY
In 1872 the owner of a tract of land in Washington, D.C. divided his property
into seven lots. Six were of normal size for building uses. The seventh, only five
feet wide, was designated a private alleyway for the purpose of providing the
other six with ingress and egress. All of the lots were sold except the alleyway,
the fee to which was kept by the original owner, who gave each of his grantees
an easement over it. By 1949, however, no taxes had been paid on the alleyway
for more than seventy years1 and the delinquency exceeded $1000.2 The de-
fendant, owner of two of the adjoining tracts, paid in the delinquency and ob-
tained a tax deed to the alleyway. 3 He then blocked the customary access of
57 343 U.S. at 120. Cf. White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938).
8 See, however, 5 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 847, 849 (1952), noting the Lykes case. The note
reiterates the legislative grace doctrine with the apparent implication that Lykes involves no
change of law in this respect.
6' See American Bar Ass'n, Section of Taxation 35 (1952).
'If the alleyway had been dedicated to public use, it would have been tax exempt, and the
problem with which this comment is concerned would not have arisen. Crane-Berkley v. Lavis,
238 App. Div. 124, 263 N.Y. Supp. 556 (1933); People ex rel. Poor v. Wells, 139 App. Div. 83,
124 N.Y. Supp. 36 (1910); Iowa Loan Trust v. Bd. of Supervisors of Polk County, 187 Iowa
160, 174 N.W. 97 (1919).
2Engel v. Catucci, 197 F. 2d 597 (App. D.C., 1952). See particularly Brief for Appellant
and Joint Appendix 11a.
3 Statutory requirements and procedure for acquisition of tax deeds vary greatly in detail
but their broad outlines are similar. After a certain specified period of delinquency varying
from one to four years, the taxing authority's lien is sold publicly at a minimum figure which is
the total of back taxes, interest, penalties and costs of the sale. The buyer gets a tax certificate.
Within an additional specified period of one to three years, the delinquent owner may remove
the lien by recovering the tax certificate from the buyer at cost and paying any additional
taxes and penalties. If the redemption privilege is not exercised, a deed vesting an indefeasible
title is issued on application to the taxing authority in two-thirds of the states. Elsewhere,
judicial proceedings similar to a mortgage foreclosure are required. In those jurisdictions where
no judicial proceedings are required, tax deeds are considered untrustworthy by title examiners,
and a suit to quiet title is often recommended. If the lien is not sold, the taxing authority
acquires the title at the end of the redemption period by application or foreclosure. During the
whole process the assessed owner is given notice by mail at intervals, and notice,'either by
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